Naxal Attack In Gadchiroli

In a massive setback to the Maharashtra government’s counter-Naxal campaign, particularly in its eastern belt, a group of over 150 Naxals laid an ambush on a police party near the Markegaon village in Gadchiroli district bordering Chhattisgarh on 1 February resulting in the death of 15 policemen. Although Gadchiroli has been a hotbed of Maoists for a long time, the unprecedented scale of the attacks took the Maharashtra police by surprise. According to the central government’s Ministry of Home Affairs records, the state has witnessed a decline in Maoist activity and violence in the past years. What then explains the near-perfect execution of such a large attack? What are the implications of the attack and what are the likely outcomes of the attack on the nature of Naxal conflict in the state? The spread of Maoists in Gadchiroli along with its adjoining districts in Maharashtra is seen largely as a spillover from neighboring Naxal-affected districts of Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh with the terrain and demography of the region (over 90 per cent of Gadchiroli district is designated as forest area and has close to 40 per cent of its population made up of tribals) providing a fertile ground for the growth of Maoists. In recent times however, the Maoist cadre came under severe strain due to the dual strategy of the Maharashtra police – that of targeting the armed cadres while at the same time engaging with the local population through welfare programmes. Through sustained combing operations and surrender policy (implemented in August 2005), the Maharashtra police boasted of arresting at least 656 Naxalites including some of the top commanders of the outfit while securing the surrender of at least 320 since 2005, resulting in the winding down of many dalams. At the same time, programs like the Jan Jagran Abhiyan initiated activities like free medical services, cultural shows, sports activities, organized marriage ceremonies and camped with the villagers with the intention of breaking the support system of the Maoists among the villagers and winning their confidence and trust.Given this, do the attacks then reflect a desperate last attempt by the Maoists to make their presence felt or a manifestation of their revival in the region? A couple of factors indicate the latter. According to media reports, the CPI (Maoist) held a meeting sometime in early January and decided to merge its Maharashtra operations with the Dandakaranya cell in an attempt to revive their presence in the region. The fact that these attacks involved cadres from Chhattisgarh as confirmed by the local police lends credence to such reports. However, it seems unlikely that a joint plan to carry out the attacks was made and implemented in such a short duration, giving the impression that the efforts to combine the forces have indeed been ongoing for a while without the knowledge of the police. Coupled with this, several shortcomings in the government’s implementation of its counter-Naxal policies such as shortage of funds for the surrender schemes, further punctuate the police claims of success. This is also borne out by the betrayal of the ‘police informer’ who with false information, was able to lure the police into the jungle where the attack took place. What are the implications of the attacks? To begin with, this reflects a shift in the tactics of the Maoists in Maharashtra. In the past three years, their main target has been civilians including suspected police informers, surrendered Naxals, traders, and contractors. Attacks on security forces have however, recorded an upward trend since October 2008 with at least two Naxal attacks on police parties resulting in the death of four policemen. Second, a trend of joint operations between cadres from different states has been noted in some of their big attacks such as the Nayagarh attack in Orissa in February last year. This further complicates the fight against Maoists across the heartland with law and order being a state subject and highlights the need for a coordinated approach among the states. Lastly, this attack will propel the state to review its counter-Naxal policies likely pushing it towards a more belligerent stance against the Naxals. This in turn would imply that more violence can be expected from this region for it can be safely assumed that in carrying out this attack, the Naxals would have factored in the prospect of a crackdown by the state and are indeed prepared to engage with the state. In doing so, however, the state must take precautions in ensuring that its policies do not become part of the problem itself, as in the case of Chhattisgarh with Salwa Judum, and only ends up reinforcing the very factors that are sustaining the Naxal movement. The past few years has seen a systematic strengthening of the people’s war being waged and led by the CPI (Maoist). From Chhattisgarh in 2005-06 to Bihar-Jharkhand in 2006-07 and the Orissa-Andhra border in 2008, the people’s war has moved from the stage of mass mobilization to protracted armed struggle in these states. With the latest attacks, the possibility of a similar transition in Maharashtra cannot be ruled out.